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Abstract 
The use of secrecy in the form of secret evidence and secret hearings had a limited role in modern democracies 
where the focus is on open justice. This changed after the events of 11 September 2001.  Secrecy may be a 
necessary adjunct to maintaining military options, for combating organised crime and countering terrorism but 
like a double-edged sword it can also cut into the fabric of the democratic state via abuses of power, and the 
maintenance and expansion of organisations beyond their usefulness. This paper considers the use of secrecy in 
Australia with particular reference to its impact on the administration of justice in terrorism matters. It reveals 
an increased use of secret evidence covered by new legislation that directly impacts on the trial process. It 
raises issues of fairness to accused persons and others who may be required to obtain security clearances to do 
their job. For the present, the system seems to work fairly, if only because of the skill, ability and commitment to 
fair justice of parties who work in the criminal justice system; but, there is a clear potential for abuse by those 
who say they require secrecy to protect Australians from terrorists.  
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Secrecy is a mainstay of intelligence and increasingly of government activities. Secrecy is the planned 
restriction of access to information and knowledge. Though it has a role in modern democracies, it can be a 
double-edged sword in that the use of secrecy can advance the interests of a state; but, its use can also damage 
state institutions with its potential to eventually threaten the democracy itself. For example, secrecy is a 
reasonable and necessary tool of trade for police, security and military forces. But these same entities can also 
use secrecy to advance their own interests at the expense of citizens and traditional rights and freedoms. The use 
of secrecy also conflicts with traditional principles of open justice. Generally citizens pay little attention to the 
issue of secrecy largely because they are either not aware of it or assume everything is all right if it does not 
directly impact on their lives. In Australia secrecy is more noticeable because of its overt association with 
Australia’s response to terrorism in response to the events of 11 September 2001. Justice Whealy noted that for 
persons accused of terrorism offences, “prejudice, delay and secrecy are the principal problems confronting a 
trial judge in these matters” (Whealy, 2007, p. 757). This paper looks at Australia’s use of secrecy in terrorism 
matters and its adverse impact upon the administration of justice and ultimately upon democracy. Secrecy is 
also increasingly evident in other government business, especially government contacts with private entities 
wherein commercial in confidence clauses prevent disclosure of contractual details to the public.i  
Responses to the use of secrecy by governments vary. On one side, are intellectuals like Norm Chomsky who 
noted in regard to the United States of America that “government secrecy is not for security reasons, 
overwhelmingly – it’s just to prevent the population here from knowing what’s going on” (Mitchell & 
Schoeffel, 2002, p. 10).  On the other side, are the proponents of secrecy who argue that the release of certain 
information to the public would adversely impact upon national security. Whereas Chomsky was probably 
correct for governments in general (Mitchell & Schoeffel, 2002, p.10 – 12), in matters of terrorism the reality 
lies between the two viewpoints. Australians, however, should be very careful about too readily accepting this 
increased resort to secrecy by government authorities. Jenny Hocking recounts in detail the use of secrecy and 
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resultant abuse of power by intelligence officers and special branch police up to the early 1970s, in breach of 
the law, the rights of an elected government and the trust of the Australian people (Hocking, 2004).  
The secrecy Hocking referred to fell into three areas. The first involved the establishment of intelligence 
agencies (Hocking, 2004, p.181-192) without parliamentary or legislative oversight (Hocking, 2004 at 181-
192).  Second, is what would be considered traditional intelligence/police secrecy wherein files were compiled 
on anybody of interest to the respective agencies, including labor party politicians (Hocking, 2004, p. 16 & 59). 
However, Hocking noted that most of this data was political in nature (Hocking, 2004, p.39-69).  The third and 
most damning was the political allegiance of agencies favouring liberal/national parties with the receipt of 
information and the exclusion of the labor party. Hocking noted that the Director of Military Intelligence, Spry 
in 1947 wanted a senior public servant to swear an oath not to convey information to his Labor Minister and 
Prime Minister Menzies was prepared to not follow custom with the result that important intelligence matters 
were not passed onto the Labor Opposition Leader (Hocking, 2004, p.21 & 30).  
The use of secrecy in Australia’s response to threats of terrorism is aided by the maintenance of a heightened 
level of fearii of a potential, but unspecified, act of terror in the community. What is clear since the events of 11   
September 2001 is that though a terrorist attack from outside Australia against Australia is possible, it cannot be 
ruled out that the greatest threat lies in home-grown terrorismiii and surprisingly the impact of terrorism 
legislation on democratic principles. This latter impact is made worse by the increased use of secrecy as a tool 
to combat terrorism.  This flows through to court proceedings against accused terrorists, open justice and a right 
to a fair trial.  
Australia’s terrorism legislation is significant in its extent and impact on traditional democratic principles and 
open justice because it gives significant powers to government authorities to investigate, question, conduct 
surveillance, detain; while imposing a cloak of secrecy over their activities. Much has been written about these 
issues especially the adverse impact on traditional rights and freedoms.iv Golder and Williams, for example; 
have expressed concern about the curtailing of human rights in a purported protection of the rights and security 
of citizens demonstrated in governments seeking extended time for questioning of suspected terrorists without 
free independent legal representation when a traditional fixed time frame with legal advice would enhance the 
reliability of any evidence obtained (Golder & Williams, 2006, p.52). They highlight the “rationale” of former 
Australian Attorney-General Philip Ruddock who argues reducing human rights improves human security with 
a resultant masking of what is actually taking place in lieu of openly engaging in a policy debate on the need to 
balance competing human rights and national security interests (Golder & Williams, 2006, p.52). Sometimes the 
populace gets a glimpse of political and legislative inspired misuse of power as with the Dr Haneef and Ul-
Harque cases;v but, of more concern is the potential long-term impact of these issues on the foundations of 
Australian democracy. This impact is increased by the expanded use of secrecy that plays out in terrorism trials.   
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECRECY 
Secrecy became part of the Australian Diaspora in 1907 with the establishment of the Australian Intelligence 
Corps that focused on matters military. Hocking notes that the first referendum on conscription during the First 
World War provided the means by which Military Intelligence engaged in political surveillance that “expanded 
its activities to collecting information on anti-war and Anti-conscription political groups and individuals” 
(Hocking, 2004, p. 15-6). Targeted individuals included Queensland Labor premier, T J Ryan (Hocking, 2004 , 
p. 16), Not long after the First World War had commenced the first Australian civil security intelligence 
organisation, the Counter-Espionage Bureau was established. Hocking notes that the state police forces also 
became adept at political surveillance following their enforcement of the War Precautions Act 1914-18 (Cth). 
This legislation was subsequently repealed by the War Precautions Act Repeal Act 1920 (Cth). After the First 
World War various intelligence organisations were rolled into one national body, the Intelligence Branch. 
Between the two World Wars it focused its activities on communists, largely ignoring right-wing radical groups 
that were developing in Australia (Hocking, 2004, p. 19).  
During the Second World War a new security service was created. This organisation was placed under the 
control of the Attorney General’s Department. The then Attorney General H V Evatt expressed the view that: 
It is important to impress the civil rather than the military stamp upon the proposed organisation, owing to 
the necessity for public confidence in the reasonable protection of civil rights and liberty (Hocking, 2004, 
p.20).  
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Such noble goals were largely ignored when the Labor party lost government after the Second World War and 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was created in 1949. Hocking records that Labor 
politicians were not only subject to political surveillance by ASIO but also deprived of bipartisan access to 
intelligence (Hocking, 2004, p. 30, 32, 37 & 38). In the 1960s and 1970s ASIO repeated the mistakes of 
between war intelligence organisations by failing to respond to Croatian extremism in Australia and leading to a 
raid on ASIO headquarters by the Attorney General Lionel Murphy resulting in the Hope Royal Commission. In 
the meantime many Australians, including senior Labor politician s, including Ministers, were found to have 
been the subject of political surveillance (Hocking, 2004, p43, 46 & 47). An inquiry into the security records of 
the South Australian Special Branch also revealed an emphasis on political surveillance (Hocking, 2004, p.  54-
61). It is a reasonable inference that other state special branches also engaged in political surveillance. Of equal 
concern was the revelation that security agents were leaking selective information to journalists  (Hocking, 
2004, p. 61-67). It seems Australia’s security agencies have a good record of secretly collecting information but 
up to recent times an historically poor record of collecting intelligence in the ‘national’ interest. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in the Ul-Haque matter their collection techniques can also be unlawful with agents denying a 
suspect their legal rights resulting in Adams J ruling alleged admissions inadmissible while keeping secret the 
names of ASIO officers (R v  Ul-Haque  [2007]) a secrecy denied police officers held to have acted illegally. 
THE LAW OF SECRECY IN AUSTRALIA 
The principle of open justice is fundamental to maintaining justice in Australia. It runs hand-in-hand with 
the right of an accused to a fair trial.vi Fairness is a principle not a right as set out in legislation. Australia 
does not have a Commonwealth Human Rights Actvii or protections like those available in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America. Furthermore, there is no inherent power of courts to 
exclude the public (John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW (2004) per Spigelman CJ at 
[18]). Courts should hold public hearings except where ‘the nature of the circumstances of the particular 
proceedings are such that a public hearing would frustrate or render impracticable the administration of 
justice’ (John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW (2004); Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Waller 
(1985) at 13). The test is one of necessity, deciding whether it is “really necessary to secure the proper 
administration of justice’ (John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW (2004)). 
 
Spigelman CJ in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW (2004) [35-7] explained this test of 
necessity as: 
the test of necessity adumbrated by Lord Morris of Borth-y-gest in Connelly v Director of Public 
Prosecutions at 1301: "[t]here can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular 
jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction"… 
Viscount Haldane LC confirmed the strictness of the test in a relevantly analogous context in Scott v 
Scott [1913 AC 417 at 438: 
"But unless it be strictly necessary for the attainment of justice there can be no power in the court to 
hear in camera ... He who maintains that by no other means than by such a hearing can justice be done 
may apply for an unusual procedure. But he must make out his case strictly and bring it up to the 
standard which the underlying principle requires. He may be able to shew that the evidence can be 
effectively brought before the Court in no other fashion. He may even be able to establish that 
subsequent publication must be prohibited for a time or altogether. ... [H]e must satisfy the Court that 
by nothing short of the exclusion of the public can justice be done."  
There are statutory exceptions to this principle. They include the power to make a suppression or non-
publication order, orders for non-publication of information and closing of the court. Justice Adams closed the 
court in hearing the arguments concerning the admissibility of Ul-Haques admissions because of the sensitive 
nature of some of the evidence (R v  Ul-Haque  [2007]).  
Privacy issuesviii also play a role requiring judicial and court staff to take account of the risks in publishing 
personal or private information in court judgements. Courts generally have powers to suppress information or 
order non-publication when the court thinks this is necessary to prevent prejudice to, amongst other things, 
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national or international security and to protect the safety of persons.  These orders are challengeable. Courts 
also have the power to prohibit the publication of certain information. In the Ul-Haque matter Justice Adams 
released his judgement but ordered the names of ASIO agents including those who had acted illegally, be 
suppressed ((R v  Ul-Haque  [2007]). Police officers  in similar situations do not have the luxury of remaining 
anonymous. Commonwealth legislation also empowers Courts to prohibit publication of evidence relating to 
certain functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions usually civil functions and proceedings under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)  (s.16A Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth). There are also 
powers to restrict publication in matters involving persons apprehended under warrant (s.96 Service and 
Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth)).   
Commonwealth legislation also contains provisions enabling courts to exclude the public and make orders 
concerning non-publication of evidence (s.85B Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) to protect disclosure of official secrets 
so long as it is in the interest of defence of the Commonwealth (Part VII Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) and likewise in 
regard to matters concerned with espionage and similar activities where the test is concerned with the security 
or defence of the Commonwealth ( Part 5.2 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)). Non-publication or suppression orders can 
also be made to protect the identity of agents, ( s.15MK(1) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) children (s.15YR(1) Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth)) and witnesses ( Witness Protection Act 1994 (Cth)). Contravening such orders is an offence, 
including anything said when such orders are made( s.15MK(4) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)). Issues related to access 
to evidence could lead to stay applications grounded on the principle of an accused is not able to have a fair 
trial. For example, in R v Harkim (1989) a permanent stay was granted on health grounds and in Jago v The 
District Court of New South Wales and Ors (1989) Deane J at [60] listed length of delay, reasons given by 
prosecutor for delay, accused responsibility for any delay, prejudice to accused and the public interest in the 
resolution of serious criminal matters as the five key points for such applications.    
Prior to 11 September 2001 secrecy played a role in Australia controlled largely by common law and 
legislation. The overarching principle was open justice and most Australians’ knowledge and exposure to 
secrecy came in, or as a result of, court proceedings. However, experience has demonstrated why some secrecy 
is necessary in the criminal justice system. For example, the events surrounding the murder of Carl Williams in 
protective custody in a Victorian prison demonstrates one aspect of why secrecy has a role.ix Williams was 
killed because of what he knew and might tell police or because he was offering to give evidence against a 
former Victorian Detective, Paul Dale.x The release of information that a prisoner is giving adverse information 
about associates to the authorities places that prisoner’s life in danger.xi  The administration of justice requires 
some secrecy, but it has limits, notwithstanding acknowledged risks. Or to put it another way, there needs to be 
a continual balancing of the need for open justice against a justifiable need in certain circumstances for secrecy. 
This was demonstrated some years ago when an application to close the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
during sentence proceedings was made because evidence of assistance in a forthcoming murder trial placed both 
the prisoner being sentenced and close family at risk. The application was rejected on public policy grounds, 
even though the prisoner was the sole source of incriminating evidence in an hereto unsolved murder. xii This 
principle of open justice in Australia means the public usually have access to information revealed in court 
proceedings leading to actual knowledge of the key facts and issues. The collective impact is maintenance of 
confidence in the criminal justice system.  
SECRECY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
Following the events of 11 September 2001 the use of secrecy in investigations and courts was significantly 
expanded in Australia. This expansion took place in the absence of any Human Rights instrument, the existence 
of which would have influenced drafting and consideration of the bills in parliament. Parliament has before it 
the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010. It is reasonable to assume that this Bill, if enacted; will 
have the unintended consequence of negating the need for Commonwealth human rights legislation. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a human rights instrument Australian courts look to maintain traditional common 
law principles of fairness and the right to a fair trial. For example; prejudice to the accused has included general 
issues linked to religion (Whealy, 2007, p.748), harsh custody impacting upon ability to give instructions and to 
concentrate during trial (R v. Benbrika [No.12  ] (2007)), overt courtroom security requiring a Perspex screen to 
be removed to avoid an inference of dangerousness (R v. Benbrika [No. 12] (2007)) and publicity associated 
with terrorism trials locally (R v. Benbrika [No. 19] (2008)) and internationally (R v. Elomar [No. 27] (2009)). 
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In 2004 the Australian Government enacted the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil) 
Proceedings Act 2004. The object of this legislation is to prevent disclosure of information in proceedings 
“where the disclosure is likely to prejudice national security, except to the extent that preventing the disclosure 
would seriously interfere with the administration of justice” (s. 3 National Security Information (Criminal and 
Civil) Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)). This replaces public interest immunity claims.xiii The new legislation 
establishes a framework for dealing with information that has national security implications. The steps to be 
followed can be summarised as: 
 Either the prosecutor of defendant must notify the Federal Attorney General (ss. 24-5 
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil) Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)). 
 The Attorney General can then issue a certificate that of itself is conclusive evidence that any 
disclosure of the identified information is likely to prejudice national security ( ss. 26-8 
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil) Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)), and; 
 The judge then closes the court for a hearing of the evidence. The Attorney General can 
require the accused and/or the lawyers for the accused to be ordered to vacate the court unless 
the lawyer has an appropriate security clearance (ss. 29 National Security Information 
(Criminal and Civil) Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)).  
 In the closed hearing the judge will consider the competing interests of national security 
versus impact on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. In this assessment the judge must give 
more weight to national security ( ss. 31 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil) 
Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)).  
 The judge can allow or not allow use of the information or permit modified disclosure in a 
form suggested by the Attorney General or as ordered by the court (ss. 24-5 National Security 
Information (Criminal and Civil) Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)). 
The new procedures have been criticised. In R. v Lodhi, Justice Whealy took the view that the Attorney 
General’s certificate was not conclusive on the risk to national security (R v. Lodhi, (2006) (Whealy, J)). The 
case against Lodhi centred on his collection of two maps of the Australian electricity system, sourcing 
information on explosives, assembling aerial photographs of Australian defence establishments and having a 
document about how to make explosives. His Honour has subsequently written critically about the new regime 
and its implications for the conduct of criminal trials, including the impacts on lawyers and court staff who may 
have to obtain security clearances and the potential for lawyers to be imprisoned for failing to notify the 
Attorney General of any information that may affect national security (Whealy, 2007, p. 748).  
The other important and far-reaching use of secret evidence lies in the ability of the government to use control 
orders (Division 104 Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Cth)) and preventative detention orders against persons of 
interest.  The first use of control orders were against Joseph Thomas and David Hicks, but these have now 
expired. A control order can be sought if the government believes the making of a control order would 
substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act and related activities. The test for the court is on the balance of 
probabilities, can be made ex parte and supported by evidence that can remain secret. Whereas control orders 
are judicial, preventative detention orders are administrative and can initially be made for 14 days (Division 105 
Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Cth)). The object of preventative detention orders is to prevent an imminent terrorist 
event or to preserve evidence of terrorist activity. Again, there are non-disclosure provisions allowing secret, 
un-tested information to be used by the authorities against suspected persons.  
Even the States in Australia have enacted legislation with secrecy provisions. For example, in Western Australia 
there is the Terrorism (Extraordinary Powers) Act 2005 (WA), a statute giving the police commissioner 
extraordinary powers to, amongst other things, issue covert search warrants in regard to terrorism matters. The 
issue of such warrants has limited safeguards that start with the involvement of a Supreme Court judge and after 
that an annual report to the Minister. The warrant cannot be challenged while in operation and it also allows 
other offences to be picked up while acting on the warrant (s. 27 (7)(e) Terrorism (Extraordinary Powers) Act 
2005 (WA)).  Western Australia also has its own preventative detention regime (Terrorism (Preventative 
Detention) Act 2006 (WA)). Section 46 of this act imposes secrecy provisions in the form of non-disclosure 
requirements on targeted persons, a breach of which carries a prison sentient of up to 5 years. A lack of 
privileged contact (between a suspect and lawyer) is another feature of this legislation. Unless the police officer 
nominated for the purposes of the preventative detention approves privileged contact between suspect and 
lawyer it cannot take place (s.44(2) Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2006 (WA)). If the lawyer has a 
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current security clearance to “Secret” given by the Attorney General’s Department of the Commonwealth the 
lawyer may be allowed unmonitored access (s.44(7) Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2006 (WA)). 
Finally, the legislation places restrictions on the publication of Supreme Court proceedings conducted in regard 
to the act (s.53 Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2006 (WA)) unless the Minister authorizes publication 
or it “could not conceivably prejudice national security and that its publication should be authorised in the 
public interest” (s.53(3) Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2006 (WA)). 
WHAT IS BEING KEPT SECRET? 
It is difficult to know what is actually being kept secret in matters of terrorism. It is common knowledge that 
ASIO prepares reports on persons seeking admission as refugees or seeking asylum or to enter Australia as 
migrants and sometimes these reports are adverse and secret,xiv often available only to judges of the court and 
persons with appropriate security clearances (Mansour Leghaei v Director-General of Security and Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) But several important issues have surfaced. One has the 
hallmarks of Kafka as reported by the editor of the Australian Law Journal, Mr Justice  P W Young  AO: 
The Sydney Daily Telegraph of 2 November 2006 raised the concerns of some court staff in Sydney, 
such as court officers, recording monitors, and typists, who were told that they had to complete a long 
document including many personal details and provide five references including one from a Member 
of Parliament. The New South Wales Council of Civil Liberties spokesman was trenchant in criticism 
of this process. A government spokesman said that the form was voluntary, but added that participants 
would be breaching the Secrets Act if they disclosed that they were filling in the form. (Young, 2007, 
p. 8). 
Others relate to the impact on the administration of justice and ensuring accused persons receive a fair trial. The 
latter is an unalienable right of persons’ accused of serious criminal offences and most terrorism offences 
provide for cogent punishment. A fair trial is essential if the community is going to seriously punish persons 
who break the law. Sometimes a court will decide that accused persons cannot have a fair trial without access to 
secret evidence. This happened some years ago following a 1986 demonstration at Pine Gap in the Northern 
Territory where several protestors were arrested and charged. In this case the government decided to set an 
example and rather than charge the protestors with minor offences they were charged pursuant to the s. 9 and 17 
Defence Special Undertakings Act, 1942 (Cth)xv and also under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The four protestors 
were found guilty but both sides appealed, the protestors over the failure of the Crown to prove that Pine Gap 
was a top secret facility and the Crown over the leniency of sentences that were imposed. The Northern 
Territory Court of Appeal quashed the convictions (The Queen v Law & Ors [2008]). Ron Merkel QC summed 
up the situation in an Law Report on Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio show on the matter in 2008: 
But underlying that issue [the central issue here was whether the Defence could or couldn't argue that 
Pine Gap was in fact a defence facility, and therefore a prohibited area within the legislation?] was a 
much more fundamental question, and that is that Pine Gap had been a top secret facility since its 
creation in the 1960s. So secret were the activities there, that even parliamentary committees charged 
with investigating and understanding Australia's defence facilities were not ever given full information 
about what went on at Pine Gap. The irony of this case was that having brought a prosecution under 
the Act for the first time, the Commonwealth, through the DPP, had opened up to surveillance within 
the court before these four protesters, the very issue they'd  kept in effect, secret for so long, and that 
was a consequence which ultimately led the accused to succeed, because the Crown  hadn't been able 
to establish finally that it was a defence facility, nor could the accused challenge that issue on a final 
basis, because the trial judge did not allow those matters to be raised at trial, before trial, or as matters 
that could go to the jury.xvi 
This is one example of how one type of secret information can have a direct effect on the administration of 
justice. It is possible to deduce with some accuracy other types of information being kept secret from experience 
gained in appearing in criminal trials and from what is reported about terrorism trials. In criminal trials it is not 
unusual in serious matters involving organised crime and drug importations for the Crown or Federal Police to 
ask the court for secrecy to be maintained in regard to certain matters. These matters include maintaining the 
anonymity of undercover police officers, non-disclosure of how access was gained to premises and not only the 
type of surveillance equipment used but how and where it was installed. In other words the police seek to 
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maintain a cloud of secrecy over matters concerned with how some information was obtained, how operations 
were planned, some of the procedures used in the investigation and the types of equipment used in executing the 
police investigation. The case for maintaining secrecy relies on a not unreasonable perceived need to conceal 
certain operational methods so as to not prejudice on-going and future operations, especially the identity of 
undercover operatives. In other words, if the techniques remain secret criminals cannot take preventative or 
evasive action and undercover operatives have some protection from retribution. This approach seems to have 
few, if any critics because the outcomes of such operations are the evidence revealed in court proceedings, in 
open court. In other words, though applications are made to keep operational matters secret, evidence obtained 
is not secret. Furthermore, an accused is not prevented from making an application to the court that in the 
interests of justice and obtaining a fair trial the police should be required to reveal operational matters.   
In terrorism trials there is an additional layer of secrecy that is troubling. That is the use of national security 
grounds as a basis to have evidence used against an accused without the accused and/or accused lawyers having 
access to that evidence or closing the court and excluding the defendant and defendant lawyers while that secret 
evidence is considered. In the traditional criminal trial this is resolved by the court making an assessment with 
or without involving lawyers representing the accused.  Because lawyers are also officers of the court it is not 
unreasonable to allow access on a confidential basis to all or part of the ‘secret information’. But in the end the 
presiding judge will make a ruling on access or use in evidence that binds the parties. Justice Whealy raised the 
possible future option of using special counsel who hold appropriate security clearances to help the defendant 
and assist the judge. His Honour referred to discussions in the United Kingdom where it was held that such 
appointments should be “exceptional, never automatic; a course of last and never first resort” (Whealy, 2007, p. 
751).  Such appointments would clearly be approved by security agencies seeking to maintain control over 
information they deem should be kept secret because they would also have input into the conduct of security 
clearances giving them some sway over the appointment of counsel and the level of security clearance. 
However, the real issue is the maintenance of the criminal justice system to the benefit and confidence of the 
community. There is a long established tradition in common law that an accused person can choose their 
lawyer. Requiring lawyers to submit to security clearances or rely on lawyers appointed from a pool of security-
cleared lawyers infringed upon this right. Justice Young AO makes the point: 
One emerging problem is that the security agencies appear to want to have the power to veto particular 
lawyers being involved in these trials. This is again understandable if the only concerns were security. 
However, the right to have the lawyer of one’s choice has been a right held dear by generations of 
Australians and those of still earlier generations under the English Common Law (Young, 2007). 
In terrorism trials there is an added layer of complexity relating to secret evidence. Justice Whealy wrote about 
this complexity and its impact on the administration of justice after presiding over the Lohdi trial (R v Lohdi 
(2006) a trial that included three months of pre-trial work including judgment and appeals. His Honour was 
critical of the complexity imposed on the trial process and by implication on the right of an accused to receive a 
fair trial by the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (Whealy, 2007, 
p.745-750). Justice Whealy identified several new important issues this legislation imposed on the trial process. 
Firstly, the requirements imposed by this legislation had the potential to impact on the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial. This can be overcome to a significant extent by co-operation between counsel, security authorities and the 
court in pre-trial procedures. The second issue is the imposition of “highly unusual obligations on lawyers 
engaged in federal proceedings. In particular, lawyers must obtain security clearance to have access to 
information concerning national security”  (Whealy, 2007, p.748). A similar obligation is required of court staff 
and court reporters, including their “spouses, partners and their financial and personal lives” (Whealy, 2007, p. 
748). Thirdly, if at any time either the prosecutor or the defendant: 
knows or believes that information which relates to or may affect national security will be disclosed, 
each is required to notify the Attorney-General and take a number of other procedural steps as soon as 
possible. Failure to comply with the requirements exposes the practitioner concerned to imprisonment up 
to two years. (Whealy, 2007, p.748) 
Other issues raised by the use of secret evidence include the use of pseudonyms, non-publication orders, 
screening of witnesses from view to provide confidentiality and the use of audio-visual links. All of these 
existed before terrorism trials and require the court to ensure open justice and a right to a fair trial are not 
unjustly infringed. Justice Whealy ruled out the use of screens in front of witnesses due to possible inferences of 
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dangerousness against the accused and opted for television monitors and audio-visual links with a non-operating 
monitor in front of the accused (Whealy, 2007, p. 753). This procedure had been used in an earlier criminal trial 
of Ngo, a successful Vietnamese business and local Cabamatta identity charged with the murder of a politician, 
John Newman ( R v Ngo (2003).  
The Australian Parliament has set in place statutory protections in the office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security whose role is to provide’independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior 
ministers and parliament as to whether Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with 
propriety by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on their activities’ (IGIS website, 2011).  Time will tell 
whether or not this is sufficient and whether the office can cover the potential workload, as it extends beyond   
classic security operations. Recent events have required commencement of investigations into community 
detention security arrangements and allegations of inappropriate vetting practices by Defence Security 
Authority,   
CONCLUSION 
Australian democracy is strong and resilient with strong institutions. However, our history has demonstrated 
that secrecy can be corrupting and affects the maintenance of good government. It can certainly impact upon the 
administration of justice. An over reliance on secrecy will eventually lead to adverse outcomes. In the United 
States of America the abuse of the law by covert wiretapping has resulted in a court in California awarding 
plaintiffs US$2.5 million in damages and attorneys’ fees for government agents violating the Federal 
Intelligence Surveillance Act  (Al-Haramain v. Obama ). The government had illegally wiretapped an Islamic 
charity’s lawyers in 2004 and this was not the first case.xvii Australia has yet to experience such litigation, but if 
history is anything to go by secret abuses of power aimed at collecting secret information against Australians, 
by Australian security agents whether they are federal intelligence officers or state police, may take place as it 
did some fifty years ago. 
 In a democracy the use of secrecy is a double-edged sword. The present situation in Australia gives too much 
emphasis on maintaining secret information that can only be assessed by those who want to maintain secrecy, 
and Judges and Ministers who take their advice from the same source. Anybody else who has a security 
clearance cannot speak out for fear of breaching the law. The general public, the citizens of the state, have no 
opportunity to assess whether or not any of the secret information really needs to be kept secret. Reliance on 
statutory officials like the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is not wise. Before too much time 
passes the government should start releasing some secret information used in early terrorism trials to maintain 
and build confidence in the present system. A one-sided system overseen by legislation that gives greater 
weight to keeping information secret (ss. 31(7)(a) & (8) National Security Information (Criminal and Civil) 
Proceeding Act (2004) (Cth)) has the potential to eventually invoke events not dissimilar to those recounted in 
Franz Kafka’s ‘The Trial’. When it comes to secrecy vigilance is essential for a healthy, safe and enduring 
democracy, a poisoned apple will generally look healthy until too late.  
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vii Human rights legislation does exist at the state level in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory: Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/cohrara2006433/ 
and  Humanand Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/hra2004148/ 
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proceedings based on threats to the prisoner and his family: Regina v Murrell [2002] NSWSC 260 (5 April 2002) available 
at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2002/260.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=crowley  (1/11/2011) 
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xn26.html  (15/10/2011) . 
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